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The North American Free
Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect
for more than two years now. Recent political and economic crises in Mexico,
however, seem to overshadow the achievements of the NAFTA after its first two
full years of implementation. In 1994, the Chiapas uprising and the assassination
of Mexico's presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio proved that despite the
NAFTA, Mexico remained politically unstable. Then, in December 1994, a major
financial and economic crisis erupted in Mexico as a result of the devaluation
of the Mexican currency. This crisis (Peso Crisis) crippled Mexico's economy
and drove Mexico into a recession in 1995.
Critics blamed NAFTA for the Peso Crisis and claimed that the promises made
to secure the passage of the NAFTA have all been broken. Supporters of the
NAFTA, on the other hand, say that without the NAFTA in place, the Peso
Crisis would have been even worse. However, both NAFTA's critics and support-
ers have lost their objectivity for analyzing NAFTA's impact due to the ap-
proaching presidential elections in the United States.
Despite Mexico's economic problems in 1995, the NAFTA's second year was
an eventful one, full of many firsts. The first binational panel formed pursuant
to Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. The United States also filed its first complaint
against Mexico under the dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 20 of the
NAFTA. With respect to the NAFTA's labor and environmental side agreements,
complainants filed the first petitions with the newly created Commission for
Environmental Cooperation in 1995. In addition, the National Administrative
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Offices created under the labor side agreement issued their first report in response
to labor-related complaints.
While the NAFTA's first year focused on establishing the institutions, rules,
and procedures necessary for the functioning of the treaty as a legal instrument,
1995 was the first year the NAFTA was fully effective.' This progress is demon-
strated by the number of petitions and complaints brought under the provisions
of the NAFTA in 1995 that went through the dispute resolution process of the
NAFTA and its labor and environmental side agreements.
This survey will only describe the most significant events of 1995 with respect
to the NAFTA. The survey will start by analyzing the prospects of the continuing
efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas after the Summit of the
Americas and in light of the Peso Crisis. This article will specifically consider
the accession of Chile to the NAFTA, which seems to be the first step towards
regional trade integration. Then, the survey will analyze the Peso Crisis itself
and its impact on the implementation of the NAFTA. Finally, the survey will focus
on the NAFTA in practice, describing how the dispute resolution mechanisms of
the NAFTA and its side agreements are taking shape.
I. Prospects for Continued Trade Liberalization in the Americas in Light
of the Peso Crisis: Politics Slow Down the Momentum
The year 1995 started on a high note with respect to free trade initiatives, as
negotiators set January of 1995 as the date for the creation of a Free Trade Area
of the Americas. The leaders of thirty-four of the Western Hemisphere nations
agreed to this date at the Summit of the Americas, held in Miami on December
9-11, 1994. But just days later, a financial crisis erupted in Mexico that would mar
the prospects for the creation of the free trade zone. This crisis gave ammunition to
NAFTA critics, who blamed the closer trading ties with Mexico and thus NAFTA
for the crisis and its adverse consequences. However, defenders of the NAFTA
insist that the treaty actually mitigated the effects of the Peso Crisis and that it
prevented the crisis from escalating to the level of that of the early eighties.2
A. THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS
At the Summit of the Americas, the leaders of the thirty-four democratically
elected Western Hemisphere nations (all countries in the Hemisphere but Cuba)
adopted a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action for the creation of a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).3 This ambitious plan will create a
1. See Frankena, NAFTA's First Year: Commerce Grows and Institutions Take Shape, but
Numerous Technical Problems Arise, MEXIco TRADE & LAW REP. (1995).
2. Mexico's Economic Recovery Shows Need for Economic Cooperation, Summers Says, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 40, 1688 (Oct. 11, 1995).
3. Hemispheric Leaders Unveil Americas Free Trade Zone, NAFTA WATCH, Vol. 1, No. 22,
p.1, Dec. 15, 1994.
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market consisting of 850 million people and $13 trillion in trade by the year
2005. The FTAA will be accomplished through the merger of the six subregional
trade agreements currently in existence in the Hemisphere: NAFTA, CARICOM,
MERCOSUR, the Central American Common Market, the Group of Three, and
the Andean Pact.4
The Declaration of Principles adopted at the Summit commits the governments
of the Americas to: (1) preserve and strengthen the community of democracies
of the Americas; (2) promote prosperity through economic integration and free
trade; (3) eradicate poverty and discrimination in the Western Hemisphere; and
(4) guarantee sustainable development and conserve the natural environment for
future generations.5 Thus, the FTAA is not only a trade agreement, but also a
pledge to foster democracy and development throughout the Americas.
With respect to promoting prosperity through economic integration and free
trade, the Plan of Action calls for negotiations to begin immediately to establish
the FTAA.6 The Immediate Action Agenda of the Plan directs the trade ministers
from each country to hold ministerial meetings in June of 1995 and in March
of 1996. These meetings will determine the areas of commonality and divergence
in present regional trade agreements and make recommendations for achieving
the FTAA. Further, the Plan directs the Organization of American States (OAS)
Special Committee on Trade to prepare a report studying economic integration
arrangements in the Hemisphere by the June 1995 meeting of ministers.
At the Summit, the members of the NAFTA (Canada, Mexico, and the United
States) formally invited Chile to become the.NAFTA's fourth member. NAFTA
members chose Chile ahead of other Latin American nations due to its strong
record on free-market reform, economic performance, economic growth, and
low unemployment.
1. A Free Trade Area of the Americas
The FTAA proposed at the Summit of the Americas promises to be a historic
step that will create the world's largest market.7 The plan for the creation of the
FTAA calls for a period of information gathering and a period of negotiations
among the parties, culminating with the formation of the FTAA by the year 2005.
Although the creation of the FTAA will involve the merging of the various
subregional trade agreements, the NAFTA is the treaty upon which the FTAA
will be modeled. The FTAA initiative represents the continuation of President
Bush's pledge in 1990 under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) to
4. Id.
5. Declaration of Principles: Partnership for Development and Prosperity-Democracy, Free
Trade and Sustainable Development in the Americas, issued at the Summit of the Americas, Miami,
Florida, Dec. 9-11, 1994.
6. Plan of Action, issued at the Summit of the Americas, Miami, Florida, Dec. 9-11, 1994.
7. Guardian (G), USA: America to Establish Largest Free Trade Bloc, Dec. 12, 1994.
SUMMER 1996
348 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
create a free trade zone extending from "the port of Anchorage to Tierra del
Fuego. "'
2. The Chilean Accession
The accession of Chile to the NAFTA is the first step towards the creation of
an FTAA. The accession of Chile would be a powerful incentive for other Latin
American countries to accelerate the pace of economic liberalization and reform
needed to create the framework upon which a successful FTAA can be built. 9
At the very least, Chile's accession to the NAFTA would put additional pressure
on other Latin American nations to open their markets.
But Chile's accession to the NAFTA has run into two obstacles that have
dimmed the hopes that Chile will become the newest member of the NAFTA
before 1998. First, increasing protectionist sentiments in Washington, stirred in
part by the Peso Crisis, have dampened many Congressmen's enthusiasm for any
further trade liberalization initiatives.,o In fact, former Senator and presidential
hopeful Bob Dole called for a cooling-off period in future trade negotiations. A
second obstacle has been President Clinton's failure to obtain new fast-track
authority. Without this fast-track authority, Chile refuses to enter into meaningful
negotiations on substantive issues regarding its accession to the NAFTA.
Fast-track was an approach for negotiation of trade agreements developed by
the President and Congress in 1974. Fast-track arose because U.S. trading part-
ners would not give their bottom line position during trade negotiations for fear
that Congress would modify the trade agreement to their detriment. 1 The key
characteristic of fast-track authority is that after the President signs a trade
agreement with another nation, Congress can only vote for or against the package,
without amending either the agreement or the implementing legislation.12 In ex-
change, the President must have close consultations with Congress throughout
the negotiation process and Congress must have an opportunity to review the
completed trade agreement before the President signs it. The most recent fast-track
authority expired on December 31, 1994.
Differences between Republicans and the Clinton administration regarding the
treatment of labor and environmental issues in Chile's accession to the NAFTA
derailed the passage of fast-track legislation. As of this writing, the prospects
8. Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 1 Pub. Papers 873, 875
(June 27, 1990). See O'Hop, Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under
a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127 (1995).
9. Matte, Chile Should Join NAFTA, Mexico Trade & Law Rep., (August, 1995).
10. Chilean NAFTA Accession Being Blocked by U.S. Protectionism, Chretien Charges, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), (Oct. 11, 1995).
11. See Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United
States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L., 7 (1995).
12. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §§ 1101-07, as amended by 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-06 (1988 & Supp. V 1933).
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for renewal of fast-track authority are not good; and Chile's accession to the
NAFTA will probably not take place until 1998.13
Due to this delay, Canada has decided to negotiate an interim bilateral trade
agreement to ease Chile's eventual accession to the NAFTA.14 This move means
that the other NAFTA partners will be ahead of the United States in negotiating
Chile's accession to the NAFTA, as Mexico already has a bilateral free trade
agreement with Chile.
B. THE PESO CRISIS AND THE NAFTA
The Peso Crisis erupted on December 20, 1994, when the government of
Ernesto Zedillo expanded the dollar/peso exchange rate band in an attempt to
reduce the pressure on the peso. This expansion triggered a 13.2 percent devalua-
tion of the peso on the same day. This devaluation forced the Mexican Government
to let the peso float freely; and the peso depreciated from 3.5 pesos to the dollar
on December 20, 1994, to 6.3 pesos to the dollar on February 15, 1995, with
grave consequences for Mexico's financial situation.15
Due to political instability in Mexico, rising interest rates in the United States,
and smaller currency risk in advanced industrial countries, investors began pulling
away from peso-denominated Mexican securities in 1994. This exodus prompted
the Salinas administration to issue large volumes of short-term Treasury Certifi-
cates (Tesobonos) indexed to the dollar to which investors could shift their funds.
Although this policy shifted the burden of currency risk from private foreign
investors to the Mexican Government and made Mexico more susceptible to
foreign capital flight, it did help Mexico bridge its widening current account
deficit for much of 1994.16
Because of the crisis, Mexico was in danger of defaulting on its foreign debt.
The Clinton administration, concerned that a default by Mexico would have
serious adverse consequences on the U.S. economy, put together a rescue plan
to help Mexico pay its foreign debts. The International Monetary Fund (IMF),
concerned that a crisis in Mexico could spread throughout the region, also ex-
tended an unprecedented financial assistance package to Mexico. Despite this
assistance, the Peso Crisis brought dire economic consequences to Mexico. High
inflation, high unemployment, a severe credit crunch, rising interest rates, and
a general lowering of Mexican living standards are some of the adverse effects
of the crisis. In addition, the Mexican Government implemented a strict austerity
plan that reduced federal spending considerably. Nevertheless, the international
financial assistance helped restore investors' confidence and prevented a massive
13. Fast-Track, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 129 (Jan. 24, 1996).
14. MacLaren Says Canada to Negotiate Pact with Chile to Ease NAFTA Accession, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 3, 1996).
15. Kornis, Financial Crisis in Mexico, Mexico Trade & Law Rep. (ITIC), February 1995.
16. Id.
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exodus of foreign capital from the country. Mexico is now showing some signs
of stabilization.
During the crisis, Mexico has continued to implement economic adjustment
policies, clearly signaling to investors its commitment to reform. 17 For example,
analysts recently applauded a new plan by the Mexican Government to spur
economic growth. This plan includes tax incentives for businesses, controlled
wage hikes for workers, and balanced government books.18 In addition, Mexico
has tried to rely less on short-term credit. Instead, Mexico is now committed to
make medium and long-term financing, such as private direct investment, the
dominant source of foreign financing. Accordingly, Mexico has accelerated the
pace of its privatization program. Further, Mexico is encouraging more domestic
savings, following Chile's example, so as to improve the prospects for domestic
financing. This commitment to economic reform seems to be paying off, and
the Mexican economy is now showing signs of a rebound. Recent economic
indicators, including a rise in the stock market, a fall in interest rates, and slight
improvement in unemployment figures, reflect the beginning of long-term im-
provement.
Although NAFTA and the guaranteed access it gives Mexican companies to
the U.S. market actually helped Mexico survive the crisis, the Peso Crisis and
the ensuing policy response have raised some concern about the near-term pros-
pects for U.S. trade relations with Mexico and the rest of the Hemisphere.' 9
These concerns have also fueled strong criticism against the NAFTA itself.20
For instance, in the wake of the peso devaluation, a group of Congressmen
claimed that the NAFTA was a job killer and that it triggered the biggest U.S.
taxpayer bailout since the savings and loan fiasco. These Congressmen rushed
to introduce legislation to revoke the NAFTA. 2' Also, other NAFTA critics in
Congress introduced a measure that would require the United States to leave the
NAFTA if certain conditions are not met.22
In a year of presidential campaigning, attacks on the NAFTA are also attacks
on the Clinton administration, which strongly supports the trade agreement. This
conflict has somewhat politicized the debate about the benefits and weaknesses
of the NAFTA. Some Republicans attack the NAFTA as a way of discrediting
the Clinton administration's agenda, while the Clinton administration strongly
defends the treaty as its reputation and credibility are on the line. Thus, continuing
17. Treasury Says Mexico Pushing Ahead with Economic Adjustment Policies, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 35, 1485 (Sep. 6, 1995).
18. Mexican Wage, Tax, Economic Plan Wins Early Support from Analysts, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1808 (Nov. 1, 1995).
19. NAFTA Results Help Soften Mexico's Crisis, Mex. Trade & Law Rep. (ITIC), April 1, 1995.
20. See Frankena, supra note 1.
21. Lawmakers Seek U.S. Pullout from NAFTA After the Peso Falls, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
106 (Jan. 18, 1995).
22. New Measure Would Require U.S. to Leave NAFTA If Promises Are Not Met, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1928 (Nov. 22, 1995).
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support in the United States for the NAFTA might depend not only on how
Mexico emerges from its crisis, but also on how the presidential elections develop
in the United States
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE NAFTA
Accurately measuring the economic impact of the NAFTA on the North Ameri-
can economies is very difficult. The Peso Crisis created several distortions and
many of the tariffs and trade restriction that are supposed to be lifted pursuant
to the NAFTA are still in their phase-out period. Thus, any conclusions as to
the economic impact of the NAFTA may be premature; or as former Senator
Bob Dole said, "The NAFTA is a work in progress and the verdict is not yet
in. ''
23
In the United States, the debate continues over NAFTA's ability to create jobs.
Supporters of the NAFTA claimed that the treaty would create American jobs
through the opening of a large Mexican market to U.S. exports. NAFTA critics
claimed that the treaty would prompt U.S. companies, lured by Mexico's lower
wages, to move their operations across the border, resulting in the loss of thou-
sands of American jobs. The NAFTA's obvious effect is the increase in trade
between the NAFTA countries by lifting or lowering tariffs. An increase in trade
means increased exports; and exports are what many economists use to quantify
job creation as a result of the NAFTA.
Mexico is one of the fastest growing U.S. export markets. Despite the Peso Cri-
sis, Mexico is currently the third largest U.S. trading partner after Canada and
Japan.24 In 1994, the first year of the NAFTA, U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico
increased by 22 percent over the previous year and U.S. merchandise imports from
Mexico increased 26 percent. 2 Further, according to the Clinton administration
fact sheet on Mexico, nearly 700,000 U.S. jobs depend directly on exports to Mex-
ico. 26 The Peso Crisis, however, has distorted the economic figures. In November
1994, Mexico had a trade deficit with the United States of $1.5 billion. But with
a cheaper peso making U.S. goods more expensive and Mexican goods cheaper and
the slow down in the Mexican economy that accompanied the Peso Crisis, Mexico's
trade surplus reached a record $779 million in January of 1996.27 However, that
same month, Mexican imports rose for the first time since the peso devaluation,
perhaps signaling Mexico's gradual economic recovery.28
23. GOP Candidates' Trade Position, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 125 (Jan. 24, 1996).
24. Mata, U.S. Bilateral Trade Growth with Mexico Faces Mixed Prospects in 1995, Mexico
Trade & Law Rep. (ITIC) (Apr. 1, 1995).
25. Id.
26. Clinton Administration Fact Sheet on Mexico, Obtained by BNA Jan. 17, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 157 (Jan. 18, 1995).
27. Mexico's January Trade Surplus Reached $779 Million on Record Higher Exports, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 338 (Feb. 28, 1996).
28. Id.
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Despite the distortion created by the Peso Crisis, critics continue to blame the
NAFTA for job losses, even though overall the U.S. economy saw a decline in
unemployment in 1995. For instance, a report by Public Citizen's Global Trade
Watch concluded that NAFTA failed to fulfill its promises of creating jobs, and
that it actually caused the loss of thousands of American jobs. 29 The U.S. Secretary
of Commerce, however, criticized the report saying that it incorrectly applied
tests and formulas describing the relationship between exports and jobs.
Other studies indicate that NAFTA actually created thousands of jobs. The
studies claim that if trade with Mexico has an adverse impact on the economy,
this impact is because of the peso devaluation, not NAFTA. Such are the findings
by the Arizona Department of Commerce, which concluded that NAFTA created
anywhere from 2,000 to 28,000 jobs in Arizona.3 °
To conclude, the Peso Crisis made the calculation of the economic impact of
NAFTA more difficult. The Crisis led many to erroneously attribute the adverse
consequences of the crisis to the NAFTA. At the very least, conclusions are
premature as to the impact of the NAFTA, as the treaty is still too young for
its effects to be measured. In an election year, though, the NAFTA debate will
tend to be politicized, and many will draw conclusions as to the NAFTA without
any hard economic evidence.
II. The NAIFTA in Practice
The year 1995 was a test year for the NAFTA, especially its dispute resolution
provisions. This year also tested the dispute resolution provisions of the NAFTA's
labor and environmental side agreements. These provisions made a revolutionary
attempt to provide a model for international trade law for reconciling trade values
with social and environmental values.3'
A. THE NAFTA'S SIDE AGREEMENTS: A MOVE TO CENTER STAGE
The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements require each member
country to effectively enforce its labor and environmental laws. These
agreements, although not part of the NAFTA itself, were instrumental in securing
passage of the NAFTA. The side agreements moved to center stage in 1995 as
members filed various complaints under their provisions. These complaints tested
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the side agreements and created valuable
legal precedent for the future.
29. NAFTA Fails to Boost U.S. Exports, Create Jobs, Public Citizen Study Says, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Sep. 6, 1995).
30. No Massive Employment Losses to Mexico Since NAFTA Implementation, Study Says, 12
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2106 (Dec. 20, 1995).
31. The NAFTA is the first international trade agreement to specifically designate a methodology
for engaging environmental, health, and social values into the promotion of trade liberalization.
Garvey, Current Development: Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA
Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L LAW 439 (April 1995).
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1. Environment
The NAFTA has no chapters dedicated solely to environmental issues. Instead,
the NAFTA treats environmental concerns throughout the agreement. However,
environmental groups and the Clinton administration deemed this coverage of
environmental issues inadequate. Thus, the United States pushed for separate
agreements to deal with environmental issues. Consequently, in the summer of
1993, NAFTA members reached the North American Agreement on Environmen-
tal Cooperation and the Mexico-U.S. Border Environmental Cooperation
Agreement (also called side agreements). These agreements were essential to
the subsequent U.S. ratification of the NAFTA later that year.32
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)
commits the parties to effectively enforce their environmental laws and regulations
through appropriate governmental actions. 33 The NAAEC established the Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to promote cooperation on trade-
related environmental issues between NAFTA parties, to provide sustainable
development, and to enhance compliance and enforcement of the environmental
laws and regulations in the NAFTA countries. Since the CEC's inception,
however, its effectiveness in achieving this goal has drawn criticism. Many critics
believe the CEC's enforcement mechanisms are toothless and that they will have
little effect on environmental compliance. Thus, the CEC's work in 1995, the
CEC's inaugural year, was crucial to quiet its critics and to give credibility to
the NAFTA's unprecedented environmental side agreements.
The CEC is composed of the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat, and the
Joint Public Advisory Committee.35 The Council of Ministers, which is the gov-
erning body of the CEC, is in charge of discussing and making recommendations
on all environmental issues, including settling actual or potential disputes among
the parties.36 The Secretariat investigates and reviews environmental issues and
reports appropriate recommendations to the Council of Ministers.37 The Joint
Public Advisory Committee assists the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat
by providing technical, scientific, or other information.'8
The CEC has two enforcement methods to address a party's failure to effectively
enforce its environmental laws and regulations. First, under certain circum-
32. FOLSOM AND FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING NAFTA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IMPLI-
CATIONS, Matthew Bender (1996).
33. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of the
United States of America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
34. Public Meeting for Commission Established Under Environmental Cooperation: Meeting
Agenda, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,970 (1994).
35. NAAEC, art. 8(2), supra note 33.
36. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
IssuES at 17 (November 1993) [hereinafter USTR Report].
37. Id. at 18.
38. NAAEC, supra note 33, art. 16.
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stances, the CEC can prepare reports of factual records that may be disclosed
to the public so as to put public pressure on the offending party to take corrective
actions.39 Second, if one party displays a persistent pattern of failure to enforce
its environmental laws, another party can request the Secretariat to commence
a dispute resolution process similar to NAFTA Chapter 20's dispute resolution
process.40
Under this dispute resolution process, a party complaining of a persistent
pattern of failure of effective enforcement by another party may trigger the process
with a written request for consultations between the parties.4' If the dispute is
not resolved through consultations, the complaining party may request a special
session of the Council of Ministers, which must then review and discuss the
matter in an attempt to solve the dispute.42 If this session does not effectively
end the problem, the Council of Ministers may establish an arbitral panel empow-
ered to make findings of facts, determinations, and recommendations for remedial
actions. 3 Failure to implement a satisfactory remedy may lead to the imposition
of monetary sanctions." Finally, if a party refuses to pay the penalty, the com-
plaining party may impose trade sanctions to collect the monetary penalty
amount. 5
The CEC has not yet received any requests to initiate the dispute resolution
process, but has received various submissions for the preparation of factual record
reports. The report-making function of the CEC is subject to the most criticism.
This criticism stems from the CEC's policy of issuing a report in response to a
failure of a party to enforce its environmental laws. The CEC cannot issue reports
on how to improve those environmental laws. In addition, the CEC's ability to
39. The CEC Secretariat may consider a submission from any person or nongovernmental organi-
zation that a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. If the submission meets
a number of specifically delineated criteria and the Secretariat believes the development of a factual
record on the matter is warranted, the Secretariat can request approval for the preparation of the
factual record from the Council of Ministers. If the Council of Ministers approves the preparation
of the factual record, the Secretariat will then issue a factual record report that can be made public
by a two-thirds vote by the Council of Ministers. NAAEC, supra note 33, art. 14. This threat of
public disclosure is intended to encourage the offending party to take corrective actions.
This text is just a simplified description of a complex factual record preparation process and is
intended to serve only as background for 1995 NAFTA-related events. For a more detailed discussion
of this process, see Kim and Cargas, The Environmental Side Agreement to the North American Free
Trade Agreement: Background and Analysis, 23 Env. L. Rep. (ELI) 10720 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter
Kim and Cargas]; Houseman, The North American Free Trade Agreement's Lessons for Reconciling
Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379 (1994).
40. NAAEC, supra note 33, art. 22.
41. Id.
42. Id., art. 23.
43. Id., art 24.
44. Id., art. 34(4), (5).
45. The collection of monetary penalties through the imposition of trade sanctions is only available
if the offending party is Mexico or the United States. If the offending party is Canada, the monetary
penalties must be collected through the Canadian national courts. Id., annex 36A. Kim and Cargas,
supra note 39, at 10279.
VOL. 30, NO. 2
REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS: 1995 355
prepare or make public disclosure of a report has several limitations. For instance,
the CEC has information-gathering problems, which are exacerbated by the
CEC's lack of compulsory process powers. Thus, the CEC must rely on the
party's voluntary cooperation.46 Also, the Secretariat can only prepare a report
on approval by the Council of Ministers.47
As of the writing of this article, three private citizen petitions have been made
to the CEC Secretariat under Article 14 of the NAAEC for the preparation of a
factual record report. These petitions are based on an alleged failure to effectively
enforce environmental laws. Ironically, two of these petitions have been filed
against the United States Government, although by its own citizens. These peti-
tions defined and interpreted the "failure to enforce environmental laws."
2. Endangered Species Act Petition
The first petition arose out of the passage by the United States Congress of a
bill that affected the implementation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) .4 The
Biodiversity Legal Foundation and other environmental groups filed the petition
with the CEC on July 5, 1995. The petition alleged that certain budgetary rescis-
sion provisions of the bill, which prohibited the Fish and Wildlife Service from
making any new species or critical wildlife habitat designation in 1995 and re-
scinded $1.5 million from the budget allocated to these listing programs, constitute
a failure to enforce environmental laws (ESA) in violation of the NAAEC. 49
The CEC rejected the petition on September 25, 1995. The CEC interpreted
"failure to enforce environmental laws," as used in the NAAEC, to apply only
to failures by those administrative agencies or officials charged with implementing
a party's environmental laws and regulations and not to "inaction mandated by
law." 50 The CEC also emphasized that under the NAAEC, each party has the
right to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and to enact
or change accordingly its environmental laws and regulations.5
46. For example, a party can resist a request by the Secretariat for information by notifying the
Council of Ministers that it considers the request too burdensome. NAAEC, supra note 33, art.
21(2). Further, the NAAEC protects confidential business and proprietary information, information
that would impede environmental law enforcement, or information that would compromise a party's
national security interests. NAAEC, supra note 33, arts. 39, 42.
47. Id.
48. The full name of the bill is the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions
for the Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995. Pub. L.
No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73 (Apr. 10, 1995).
49. NAFTA Commission to Decide on Petition Alleging U.S. Cuts in ESA Funding Violate Side
Pact, Daily Env. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 11, 1995).
50. Commission on Environmental Cooperation Opinion Letter on Petition Regarding Application
of NAFTA Side Accord to Suspension of ESA Listings Under FY 95 DOD Supplemental Funding
Dated Sep. 25, Daily Env. Rep. (BNA) d33 (Sep. 27, 1995).
51. Id.
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B. THE LOGGING RIDER SUBMISSION
The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund filed the second petition on August 30,
1995, on behalf of twenty-four environmental groups. The petition alleged that
the United States Government failed to enforce its environmental laws by enacting
the Fiscal Year 1995 Supplemental Appropriations Disaster Assistance and Re-
scissions Act, which contains a rider allowing for salvage logging in national
52forests. The CEC rejected the petition, saying that only agencies and officials
charged with enforcing environmental laws can fail to enforce, and that charges
of failure to enforce do not apply to Congress or the President acting collectively
to enact statutes. 3
The Sierra Club attempted to distinguish this petition from the ESA petition,
arguing that the logging rider, while leaving existing environmental laws intact,
specifically precluded their enforcement. The rejection of this second petition
by the CEC Secretariat seems to confirm that, in the opinion of the Secretariat,
Article 14 of the NAAEC does not address the operations of new laws enacted
by elected officials. Both petitions and their subsequent denials have provided
valuable legal precedent with respect to what constitutes failure to enforce envi-
ronmental laws.
C. MEXICAN PORT PROJECT PETITION
The third and final petition under Article 14 since the formation of the CEC
was the first petition alleging failure by the Mexican Government to effectively
enforce its environmental laws. A group of Mexican ecology organizations filed
the petition on January 18, 1996, alleging that the Mexican Government failed
to enforce its environmental laws by approving a project to build a port terminal
on a marine natural reserve on the island of Cozumel.54 Specifically, the group
claimed that the environmental impact study conducted for the project failed to
evaluate "all the characteristics of the project," as required by Mexican environ-
mental regulations. 5 As of this writing, the CEC has not yet issued a decision
on this petition.
D. THE U.S.-MExICo BORDER ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT
The U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement (BECA) is
the other environmental side agreement of the NAFTA. BECA supplements the
52. Submission Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation on the U.S. Logging Rider, August 30, 1995, at 1.
53. Lumber Measure Didn't Result in Failure to Enforce Laws, NAFTA Commission Rules, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 3, 1996).
54. Groups File Petition to NAFTA Commission Stating Port Project Violates Mexican Law,
Int'l Bus. Fin. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 22, 1996).
55. Id.
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NAFTA, as well as the 1983 Border Environment Agreement (the La Paz
Agreement). Under the La Paz Agreement, the United States and Mexico origi-
nally established an international structure to support an extensive program of
bilateral environmental cooperation. The BECA strengthened the bilateral frame-
work created under the La Paz Agreement by creating two distinct entities for
the funding of environmental projects in the border area: the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank
(NADBank). The BECC is in charge of providing technical, financial, environ-
mental, and other expertise to environmental infrastructure projects in the border
region. The NADBank finances projects certified by the BECC. Both these organi-
zations ensure that the "environmental consequences for the border area of in-
creased trade with Mexico will be affirmatively managed.'-
5 6
The environmental problems along the U.S. -Mexico border are the result of
the lack of adequate environmental infrastructure, such as water treatment plants,
sewage treatment facilities, and waste management facilities. These plants are
needed to support the increased population attracted to the borders by the jobs
at the maquiladoras (manufacturing plants). The BECA attempted to address this
problem by creating the BECC and the NADBank to fund the much needed
environmental infrastructure projects.
However, a report by Public Citizen, a public interest group, recently claimed
that the NAFTA and the BECA actually worsen environmental conditions along
the U.S.-Mexico border. 7 This criticism is because NAFTA proponents antici-
pated that the agreement would disperse maquiladoras concentrated south of the
border, which are to blame for most of the environmental problems in that area.
However, industrialization along the border has not slowed, but has actually
increased in 1995. In addition, the group claims, the institutions created under
the BECA to address the environmental problems along the border, the BECC
and the NADBank, have not provided the funding needed for environmental
infrastructure projects. To make matters worse, several water and sewer projects
underway before the NAFTA have stopped as a result of the Mexican economic
crisis.58
Even though the NAFTA environmental side agreements may need a few more
years in practice before any conclusions can be drawn as to their effectiveness,
at the very least, the side agreements and the debate around them have clearly
stimulated growing environmental awareness in Mexico. This awareness is shown
by the attention environmental issues received in the 1994 Mexican presidential
campaign.
56. USTR Report, supra note 36, at 22. See Coronado, Legal Solutions vs. Environmental
Realities: The Case of the United States-Mexico Border Region, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 281 (1995).
57. Trade Deal Worsened Environment, Health Along Border, Group Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 8 (Jan. 3, 1996).
58. Id. See REPORT, PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA's BROKEN PROMISES: THE BORDER BETRAYED
(1996) (available from Public Citizen, 1600 20th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009).
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E. LABOR
Unlike the environment, the NAFTA says almost nothing about labor stan-
dards, rights, or regulations. The U.S. representative worried about the omission
of labor issues in the NAFTA and thus pushed for a side agreement to deal with
labor issues in 1993. The addition of labor safeguards to the NAFTA stems from
the concern that the United States will lose jobs to Mexico as a result of U.S.
companies moving their operations to Mexico to take advantage of lower costs
of labor and lax enforcement of standards. The agreement reached is called the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The main NAALC
events in 1995 centered around two complaints, one against Mexico and the other
against the United States, claiming those countries failed to effectively enforce
their labor laws. In addition, labor cooperative activities between Mexico, the
United States, and Canada continued in 1995.
1. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
While the main goal of the NAALC is to improve working conditions and
living standards in all NAFTA countries, the focus of the NAALC is on Mexico.
This emphasis is due to Mexico's poor record in workers' rights, occupational
health, and safety standards. The problem, however, is not with the lack of
adequate labor legislation in Mexico. On paper, Mexican workers have as many
rights and guarantees as U.S. or Canadian workers. The problem is Mexico's
lack of enforcement of its labor laws. Hence, the NAALC commits its signatories
to effectively enforce their labor laws.59
Nevertheless, the enforcement and dispute resolution mechanism of the
NAALC itself is even weaker than its environmental counterpart. The road to
a labor disputes arbitration panel, which has sole authority to ultimately impose
trade sanctions, is long and difficult. 6° First, arbitration is only available for
disputes over a persistent failure to enforce occupational safety, occupational
health, child labor, or minimum wage standards.61 Second, to be eligible for
arbitration, the dispute must be trade-related and covered by mutually recognized
labor laws. 62 For most other labor issues, such as collective bargaining, strikes,
union organizing, employment discrimination, and migrant workers, the only
remedy available is the publication of a report with recommendations prepared
by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). 63 Despite these enforcement weak-
nesses, adverse publicity can deter offenders, especially foreign investor-sensitive
companies that do not want to be publicly portrayed as accessories to labor law
violations.
59. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (hereinafter NAALC), art. 1.
60. Id., art. 39.
61. Id., art. 27.
62. Id., art. 23.
63. Id., art. 26.
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The National Administrative Offices (NAOs) are the heart of the NAALC
dispute resolution mechanism. These offices are responsible for receiving and
reviewing individual or organizational complaints about effective enforcement
of labor laws in the other NAACL countries. Although the NAALC provides
guidelines for the acceptance of complaints, the NAOs of each country have their
own specific procedural requirements for submission of complaints. If a complaint
is accepted, the NAO will review it and release a report. The NAO can also
request consultations between the parties; and, if the matter is not resolved, send
it to the Council of Labor Ministers for review. If the matter is not resolved by
the Council, an ECE may be established to address the dispute. The ECE will
then review the matter and prepare a final report with recommendations that are
published, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise. 
64
All four submissions filed so far with the NAOs were related to union organizing
activities. In 1994, the U.S. NAO accepted three submissions for review. In the
first two, the Honeywell and GE cases, the U.S. NAO found no evidence that
Mexico failed to enforce its labor laws. This finding led the complainants to
criticize the NAALC for being "toothless and ineffective." 65
2. The Sony and Sprint Complaints
On August 16, 1994, U.S. and Mexican human rights groups filed a complaint
with the U.S. NAO alleging that Sony Corporation's subsidiary in Mexico violated
Mexican labor laws. The complaint also alleged that the Mexican Government's
failure to correct the situation constituted a violation of the NAALC .66 The com-
plaint arose out of the firing of forty-eight workers at Sony's manufacturing
plants in Mexico. Sony allegedly fired these workers because of their involvement
in independent union organizing activities.
In its report regarding the charges, the U.S. NAO said that Sony probably
fired the workers because of their union organizing activities in violation of
Mexican labor laws. 67 The report, which focused on Mexico's enforcement of
its labor laws and not on Sony's conduct, faulted the Mexican Government for
thwarting the workers' efforts to get formal recognition of an independent union. 68
The report also called for ministerial consultations and additional cooperative
activities between Mexico and the United States to address the Mexican Govern-
ment's process for recognizing independent unions.
As a result of the ministerial consultations, the United States and Mexico
64. Id.
65. Labor: NAO Closes Book on Union NAFTA Charges Against Honeywell and General Electric,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 41 (Oct. 19, 1994).
66. Labor: Sony, Mexican Government Charged with NAFTA Labor Law Violations, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 34 (Aug. 24, 1994).
67. Labor: Mexico Union Registration Process Faulted in U.S. NAO Report on Sony Charges,
Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Apr. 14, 1995).
68. Id.
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unveiled a plan to review the way Mexico registers independent labor unions.
Under the plan, Mexico will also meet with the workers that Sony allegedly
fired to inform them of remedies available under Mexican law regarding union
registration.69 Despite these conciliatory efforts, Mexican labor authorities re-
jected the workers' second request in mid-1995 to register an independent union.7 °
This rejection has called into question the ability of the NAALC dispute resolution
process to induce compliance with the obligations under the agreement.
Laborers filed a similar complaint, but this time alleging violations of the U.S.
labor laws, with the Mexican NAO early in 1995. The complaint, filed against
Sprint Corporation by the Telephone Workers Union of Mexico on behalf of the
Communication Workers of America, arose out of the dismissal of 235 employees
and the subsequent closing of the plant where they worked.7' The union alleged
that Sprint fired the employees because of their union organizing activities at a
plant of a Sprint subsidiary in San Francisco.
The Mexican NAO released its report on the matter on June 2, 1995, and
concluded that Sprint probably violated U.S. laws protecting workers' rights to
unionize.72 The matter moved to the consultation level; and after months of
ministerial consultations, the United States and Mexico reached an accord on
December 15, 1995. 73 The accord called for a series of actions to address the
issue, including a study on the effects of sudden plant closings on free association
principles and a public hearing where the complaining workers can have an
opportunity to air their views. 74 The countries held the public hearing on February
27, 1996, and the study is expected to be complete by mid-June of 1996. The
parties brought the matter before the U.S. courts, but the courts found no violation
of U.S. labor laws.75
Although workers and union representatives criticize the NAALC for not en-
forcing compliance with the provisions of the agreement, compelling enforcement
through trade sanction or otherwise would raise many difficult sovereignty issues.
Given its limitations, the NAALC has not only increased awareness of labor
issues and problems in Mexico and the United States, but has also forced both
governments to carefully examine their labor laws. The United States and Mexico
69. NAFTA: U.S., Mexico Unveil Plans in Response to Sony Charges Filed Under NAFTA Accord,
Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Jun. 28, 1995).
70. NAFTA: Bid by Workers at Sony Maquiladora to Register Union Rejected for Second Time,
Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 9, 1995).
71. Mexico: Mexican Official Says Investigation of Sprint Not Retaliation for Sony Case, Int'l
Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (May 8, 1995).
72. Labor: Mexican NAO Report Says U.S. Labor Laws May Have Been Violated in Sprint
Firings, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Jun. 6, 1995).
73. U.S., Mexico Accord on Sprint Calls for Study of Plant Closings, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
2104 (Dec. 20, 1995).
74. Public Hearings on Sprint Charges Set for Feb. 27 in San Francisco, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 152 (Jan. 31, 1996).
75. NLRA Failed to Protect Sprint Workers, Union Tells NAFTA Trilateral Committee, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 373 (March 6, 1996).
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cannot ignore the public pressure an NAO report can exert, nor can they disregard
the problem and refuse to make changes to their enforcement practices. Accord-
ingly, the Sony and Sprint NAOs' reports enhanced the credibility of the NAALC
by showing that an adverse report can at the very least prompt meaningful consul-
tations between the parties to try to address the problem. Also, public exposure
of a violation of labor laws appears to deter companies from further violations
and has made many companies more likely to comply with their countries' labor
laws.
F. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE NAFTA
Although the dispute settlement mechanisms under the NAFTA have their
share of critics, 1995 has seen numerous complaints under the dispute settlement
provisions of Chapter 20 and Chapter 19 of the NAFTA that tested the credibility
and effectiveness of these mechanisms.
1. General Dispute Resolution Provisions
The general dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 20 of the NAFTA cover
"all disputes between the parties regarding the interpretation or application" of
the agreement or situations when "a party considers that an actual or proposed
measure of another party is or will be inconsistent with the obligations of [the]
agreement or cause nullification or impairment" of the agreement.7 6 Chapter
20 establishes a three-step method of resolving those disputes: (1) mandatory
consultations between the disputing parties; (2) if consultations fail to resolve
the matter within thirty days, a meeting with the Free Trade Commission, which
can recommend the use of alternative dispute resolution procedures; and (3) as
last resort, the convening of an arbitral panel.77
On April 25, 1995, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) filed its first com-
plaint against Mexico under the general dispute resolution provisions of Chapter
20 of the NAFTA.7" The complaint, which arose out of Mexico's refusal to issue
trucking permits to United Parcel Service's (UPS) Mexican subsidiary, alleges
that the refusal amounts to a violation of the national treatment requirement of
the NAFTA.79 The NAFTA accords U.S. express delivery companies the right
to national treatment and the right to use larger vehicles to move packages.
However, Mexican transportation regulations, which allow only Mexican nation-
76. NAFTA, art. 2004.
77. For a more detailed discussion of the general dispute resolution provisions of the NAFTA,
see Bello, Holmer, and Norton (eds.), NAFTA: A New Frontier in International Trade and Investment
in the Americas, Chapter 15 (1995).
78. U.S. Begins Trade Action on UPS's Mexico Complaint, J. COM., April 27, 1995.
79. Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, which covers investment, each NAFTA country must
accord "national treatment" to investments of the other parties. NAFTA, art. 1102. See USTR Asks
Mexico for Consultations on Treatment of Express Delivery Firm, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 772
(May 3, 1995).
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als to operate large trucks, prevented UPS from securing the permits needed to
operate large trucks. UPS claims that because of this restriction, it cannot compete
effectively against Mexican delivery firms.80
Pursuant to Chapter 20, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and its
Mexican counterpart held consultations on the UPS complaint on May 24, 1995;
and on June 7, 1995, the NAFTA Commission agreed that this case could go
forward to the panel stage. However, as a result of Mexico's issuing new draft
transportation regulations addressing UPS complaints, the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative put the panel request on hold until the new regulations are
reviewed and finalized."' On July 31, 1995, UPS terminated its cross-border
delivery ground service between the United States and Mexico. Although its
inability to operate large trucks in Mexico played a role in this decision, this
limitation was not the only factor that prompted termination of the service. Mexi-
can customs procedures, UPS claimed, also made the service inefficient and
costly. However, the decision to terminate the cross-border services did not affect
UPS services within Mexico. 2
If the complaint moves to the arbitral panel level, it will provide valuable legal
precedent as the first decision by a panel under Chapter 20. At the very least,
an arbitral panel's decision against Mexico will test Mexico's willingness to
comply with the letter of the NAFTA and will test the overall credibility of the
NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions.
Because the United States and Canada have been free trade partners under the
Canadian Free Trade Agreement since 1989, trade disputes between the United
States and Canada have received less attention than disputes between Mexico
and its NAFTA northern partners. The CFTA dispute settlement mechanism was
the model for the NAFTA approach. Nevertheless, the NAFTA dispute settlement
provisions differ from the CFTA in that they cover a broader range of disputes
and contain additional mechanisms designed for NAFTA's trilateral structure. 3
However, the United States recently brought a trade dispute against Canada
under a NAFTA obligation not covered under the CFTA. The dispute shows
that trade disputes can be settled through the NAFTA dispute settlement mecha-
nism and that the parties are willing to abide by the outcome of an arbitral panel
decision.
Before the Uruguay Round, Canada maintained quantitative restrictions on
80. Id.
81. Briefing Paper: U.S. International Trade Dispute Settlement, report prepared by the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Aug. 31, 1995 (on file with the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.)
[hereinafter USTR Report II.
82. UPS Ends Border Ground Service Citing Customs Practices and Protectionism, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1223 (July 19, 1995).
83. Chapter 20 applies to disputes between parties covering nontraditional and complex subjects
such as the environment, health, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual property, and
financial services.
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dairy products, poultry, eggs, and barley, claiming justification under article
XI.2(c) of the GATT. The CFTA did not address these restrictions. On January
1, 1995, Canada implemented its Uruguay Round concessions and began to levy
higher tariffs on imports from the United States. Thus, the United States began
Chapter 20 proceedings, claiming that the higher tariffs were inconsistent with
NAFTA's obligation not to institute new tariffs and to reduce all tariffs on cross-
border trade to zero. Accordingly, the United States held consultations with
Canada on March 1, 1995. Then the United States requested that the NAFTA
Commission review the matter. The NAFTA Commission failed to resolve the
dispute; and on July 14, 1995, the United States requested the formation of an
arbitral panel .8 A Chapter 20 arbitral panel has been selected to review the
dispute and could issue its report as early as April 1996.85
Canadian trade officials are not very confident on the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms under the CFTA or the NAFTA and doubt that a panel decision will settle
the dispute. This lack of confidence stems from the alleged "never-say-die"
attitude on the part of the United States, as evidenced by the U.S. conduct in
the Softwood Lumber case. In Softwood Lumber, a CFTA antidumping dispute
binational panel ruled against the United States. The United States not only issued
an extraordinary challenge to the arbitral panel decision, but also claimed that
the members of the panel and the extraordinary committee voted along national
lines.8 6 Thus, the losing party's reaction to the arbitral panel's ruling will help
restore the loss of confidence in the CFTA/NAFTA dispute resolution mecha-
nism.
2. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Disputes
Most of the claims filed under the NAFTA in 1995 were antidumping and
countervailing duties disputes. Chapter 19 of the NAFTA creates a settlement
mechanism for antidumping and countervailing duties disputes. This mechanism
replaces the domestic judicial review proceedings of each member country, but
applies the same standard of review that the challenged country's courts would
apply. 7 Under this mechanism, final determinations of a competent investigating
84. USTR Report, supra note 36.
85. Special Report: 1996 Trade Outlook: Canada, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 131 (Jan. 24,
1996).
86. The Great American Free Trade Fraud, TORONTO STAR, July 10, 1994, at F2. See also
Dispute Settlement Mechanism Seen as Failing to Diffuse U.S. -Canada Conflicts, 11 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1504 (Sep. 28, 1994).
Finality being one of the goals of the CFTA and the NAFTA dispute resolution process, Chapter
19 binational panel and Chapter 20 arbitral panel decisions are nonreviewable. The only exception is
the "extraordinary challenge." An extraordinary challenge is available only under such extraordinary
circumstances as gross misconduct, bias, or an attempt by a panel to take action that is manifestly
beyond the powers that panels have been given. NAFTA, art. 1904(13).
87. NAFTA, art. 1904.1. See Straight, GA TTand NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement
and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216 (Oct. 1995).
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authority of a member country in an antidumping or countervailing duty dispute
are subject to review by a five-member binational panel of experts chosen by
the three countries. This mechanism is triggered when a written request for panel
review is submitted within thirty days of the date of publication of the decision
in question. The binational panel is composed of five members and is limited to
judging whether the antidumping law of a NAFTA member is correctly applied.
As of August 31, the panel was actively reviewing thirteen cases under Chapter
19 of the NAFTA.88 Two U.S. steel companies, USX Corporation Inland Steel
Company (USX) and Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Bethlehem), made the first
request that underwent the entire review process. USX and Bethlehem filed their
request on September 1, 1994, after the Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento
Industrial (SECOFI) imposed antidumping duties on them. SECOFI determined
that various U.S. producers sold various cut-to-length plate at less than normal
value, and that such dumped sales caused injury to the domestic industry.8 9 USX
and Bethlehem argued that the final determination by SECOFI was invalid because
of procedural and technical errors made by the Ministry of Commerce in the
dumping investigation. 90
On August 30, 1995, the binational panel issued its opinion, holding that
SECOFI incorrectly applied the antidumping duties against the U.S. steel makers.
In a three to two vote, the panel ruled that SECOFI acted outside its authority
in imposing the duties because internal agency rules granting authority to investi-
gative bodies were not in place. Mexico accepted the ruling; and on September
29, 1995, its Ministry of Commerce revoked the antidumping duties against USX
and Bethlehem. 9'
Private parties from all three NAFTA countries have requested Chapter 19
binational panel review of final determinations imposing antidumping duties on
imports from the other NAFTA countries. Mexico and the United States have
exchanged antidumping duties on imports of oil country tubular goods, which
are steel tubes used in oil exploration and transportation. First, on June 28, 1995,
the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed U.S. antidumping duties on Mexican
steel tubes made by Tubos de Acero de Mexico S.A. (TAMSA) and imported
into the United States. 92 Then, on October 11, 1995, Mexico imposed antidumping
88. See Briefing Paper: U.S. International Trade Dispute Settlement, report prepared by the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 31, 1995) (on file with the Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc.).
89. In the Matter of the Mexican Antidumping Investigation into Imports of Cut-to-Length Plate
Products from the United States, Panel No. MEX-94-1904-02 (Aug. 30, 1995) (available on LEXIS
at 1995 FTAPD LEXIS 11).
90. NAFTA Dispute Resolution Panel Examines Steel Issue in First Hearing, Int'l Bus. and Fin.
Daily (BNA), April 21, 1995.
91. Mexico Complies with NAFTA Panel Decision Affecting U.S. Steelmakers, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 39, 1660 (Oct. 4, 1995).
92. U.S. Imposes Antidumping Duties Against Mexican Steel Tubes, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1325 (Aug. 2, 1995).
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duties against U.S.-made seamless steel tubes, saying that U.S. manufacturers'
unfair trade parties harmed the country's sole producer of oil country tubular
goods (TAMSA). 93 Both Mexican and the U.S. manufactures of oil country tubu-
lar goods requested the formation of Chapter 19 binational panels to review the
antidumping actions. 94
Canadian steelmakers also sought Chapter 19 binational panel review of three
Mexican antidumping determinations. 9' The first request for panel review dealt
with imports of Canadian cold-rolled sheet steel. This request was Canada's
response to a December 27, 1995, determination by SECOFI. Although the
determination in question did not result in the imposition of antidumping duties,
the Canadian steel exporter, Defasco Inc., still requested that the Chapter 19
panel clear the company's name of dumping charges. 96 The second and third
request for panel review followed SECOFI's imposition on December 28 and
30, 1995, of antidumping duties against imports of Canadian plate steel and
imports of Canadian hot-rolled sheet steel.97 The three requests are at the panel
formation stages as of the writing of this article.
Mexico's willingness to abide by a Chapter 19 binational panel decision and
to lift the antidumping duties imposed on U.S. exporters has been crucial in
enhancing the credibility of the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, especially
in light of the criticism leveled in the United States against the Chapter 19 panel
process.
III. Other Significant NAFTA-Related Events
A transportation-related dispute that arose at the end of 1995 is expected to
go through the Chapter 20 process in 1996. On December 18, 1995, U.S. and
Mexican border states were to begin cross-border trucking services. But on that
same day, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena announced that the
United States would not approve requests for permits by Mexican truckers to
operate in the United States until Mexico implemented further safeguards to
guarantee Mexican truckers' compliance with U.S. safety standards.99 According
to officials from Mexico's Ministry of Commerce, the Mexican Government will
93. Mexico Imposes Antidumping Duties Against Steel Tubes from U.S., 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 41, 1742 (Oct. 18, 1995).
94. Mexico Will Set Up NAFTA Panel to Review Imports of Steel Tubes, 12 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1979 (Nov. 29, 1995).
95. Canadian Steelmakers Seek NAFTA Panels in Three Mexican Dumping Investigations, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 254 (Feb. 14, 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Commerce Wants to Enhance Credibility of NAFTA Dispute Settlement Provision, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 500 (March 15, 1995).
99. Mexico Expects to Consult on Trucking Under NAFTA Chapter 20, Official Says, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 68 (Jan. 17, 1996).
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engage in formal consultations with the United States regarding the denial of
trucking permits pursuant to Article 2006 of the NAFTA.
U.S. officials, however, stated that the consultations will be informal and that
the U.S. actions do not give rise to a request for Chapter 20 consultations. Mexican
officials admitted that the United States did not violate NAFTA because both
governments were receiving applications for cross-border services from trans-
porters. However, Mexican officials also stated that "if the requests for permits
are perfectly legal and comply with safety standards in the two countries, there
could be a violation."'to
In the intellectual property area, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) strongly
criticized Mexico's enforcement of its intellectual property laws. BSA, which
is considering filing a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative's Office to
launch a Chapter 20 case, claims that Mexican criminal enforcement of intellectual
property rights falls short of the minimum standards established in the NAFTA
Chapter 17 on intellectual property rights and enforcement.01
IV. Conclusion
The NAFTA faced heavy criticism in 1995 as a result of the adverse effects
of the Peso Crisis. Many not only blamed the NAFTA for the crisis, but also
pointed to economic figures, distorted by the crisis, as proof that the NAFTA
was not working. This criticism slowed the momentum for continued trade liberal-
ization throughout the Americas, as evidenced by the difficulties President Clinton
had in trying to obtain fast-track authority to accelerate Chile's accession to the
NAFTA. In addition, the upcoming presidential elections have politicized the
NAFTA debate, making the treaty a vehicle for attacking President Clinton. At
the very least, this politization removes the objectivity with which the NAFTA
should be analyzed.
In terms of the NAFTA in practice, the complaints filed in 1995 under its dispute
resolution mechanisms and its side agreements on labor and the environment have
not only tested these mechanisms by putting the dispute resolution process in
motion, but have also provided valuable legal precedent for the continued imple-
mentation of the treaty. Although the complaints have also revealed some limita-
tions and weaknesses in the dispute resolution mechanisms, they have also demon-
strated that the NAFTA countries are taking their obligations under the NAFTA
and its side agreements seriously and are willing to take steps to resolve the
disputes, which is what the dispute resolution process is intended to achieve.
100. Id. Quoting Mexico's Undersecretary for International Trade Negotiations Jaime Zablu-
dovsky.
101. Business Software Alliance Considers NAFTA Case over Mexican IP Compliance, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1675 (Oct. 11, 1995).
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